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IMMIGRATION CHALLENGES OF THE 
PAST DECADE AND FUTURE REFORMS 
Fatma Marouf* 
ABSTRACT 
Over the past decade, immigrants have faced numerous challenges in the United States, 
including a dramatic increase in deportations, the expansion and privatization of 
immigration detention, major changes to the asylum system combined with drastic cutbacks 
in refugee admissions, and a new wave of racism and xenophobia. This Article discusses 
these challenges and explores possible ways to address them in 2020 and beyond. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In his Letter from a Birmingham Jail, Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote, “Anyone 
who lives inside the United States can never be considered an outsider.”1 He was 
not talking about immigrants, but his prescient words describe the situation of 
countless immigrants today, whose legal status, race, ethnicity, or cultural 
background renders them outsiders in the land where they live. Fighting 
oppressive immigration laws and policies goes beyond the issue of legal status. It 
challenges the definition of “us” and “them,” pushing people to redefine who we 
think of as “American” and recognizing our broader, shared identities as human 
beings. 
II.  INCREASED IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
Immigration enforcement became a high priority under the Obama 
Administration and remains a key issue for the Trump Administration. During 
President Obama’s first term in office, the annual number of deportations 
reached a historic high of 409,849 in FY 2012.2 The number of deportations fell 
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 1. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. RESEARCH 
& EDUC. INST., STANFORD UNIV. (Apr. 16, 1963), 
http://okra.stanford.edu/transcription/document_images/undecided/630416-019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7RD9-MQ9L]. 
 2. News Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, FY 2012: ICE Announces Year-End 
Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities and Issues New National Detainer Guidelines 
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significantly during his second term in office, dropping to 240,255 in FY 2016.3 
Under the Trump Administration, deportations have ranged from 226,000 in 
FY 2017 to 282,242 as of June 2019, remaining below peak levels under President 
Obama.4 This corresponds to a drop in the number of apprehensions by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Between 2016 and 2017, the total 
number of apprehensions by DHS dropped by 13%,5 due largely to fewer 
apprehensions along the southwest border, which decreased from 408,870 in 
2016 to 303,916 in 2017.6 However, the number of removals from the interior of 
the country was higher during the first two years of the Trump Administration as 
compared to the last two years of the Obama Administration, increasing by 30% 
from FY 2016 to FY 2018.7 
Beyond the sheer number of deportations, other important shifts in 
immigration enforcement have occurred in recent years. These include: less clear 
enforcement priorities and very limited use of prosecutorial discretion under the 
Trump Administration compared to the Obama Administration; expansion of 
expedited removal; and increased involvement of state and local law enforcement 
agencies in immigration enforcement. 
A.  UNCLEAR PRIORITIES AND LOSS OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
The Obama Administration prioritized deporting people who committed 
serious crimes and recent arrivals with no criminal record.8 Under President 
 
to Further Focus Resources (Dec. 20, 2012), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/fy-2012-ice-
announces-year-end-removal-numbers-highlights-focus-key-priorities-and [https://perma.cc/4QCB-
5HQ7]. 
 3. News Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, DHS Releases End of Fiscal Year 2016 
Statistics (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/dhs-releases-end-fiscal-year-2016-
statistics [https://perma.cc/8V5P-SCXM]. 
 4. Bob Fredericks, ICE Claims More Illegals Were Deported Under Obama than Trump, N.Y. POST 
(June 21, 2019, 2:20 PM), http://nypost.com/2019/06/21/ice-claims-more-illegals-were-deported-
under-obama-than-trump/ [https://perma.cc/ZH6N-D58Z]. 
 5. KATHERINE WITSMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIONS: 2017, at 2 (2019) [hereinafter DHS ANNUAL REPORT 2017], 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/enforcement_actions_2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A4ZW-LGB4]. DHS apprehended 460,000 noncitizens in 2017, down from 
530,000 in 2016 and 680,000 in 2014. Id. at 4–5 & tbl.1. 
 6. Id. at 5 tbl.1. 
 7. Cristobal Ramón & Lucas Reyes, Interior Enforcement Under the Trump Administration by the 
Numbers: Part One, Removals, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR. (June 19, 2019), 
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/interior-enforcement-under-the-trump-administration-by-
numbers-part-one-removals/ [https://perma.cc/RZ4B-2LFP]. 
 8. See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. 
Winkowski et al., Policies for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Undocumented 
Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion%
281%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/RLJ3-BDZW]; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to ICE Emps., Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the 
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (Mar. 2, 2011), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8FE4-42LT]; Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Immigration 
& Customs Enf’t, to ICE Emps., Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, 
Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 30, 2010), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2010/civil-enforcement-priorities.pdf 
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Obama, DHS implemented a policy of exercising prosecutorial discretion in cases 
that did not fall within the administration’s priorities.9 The “Morton Memos” 
issued in 2010 and 2011 prioritized around 27% of the unauthorized population, 
and subsequent guidance issued in 2014 prioritized only about 13% of the 11.3 
million unauthorized immigrants.10 Consequently, thousands of cases were 
“administratively closed,” meaning they were taken off immigration judges’ 
dockets and not prosecuted.11 
Under President Trump, DHS rescinded these Obama-era policies and issued 
a new policy that fails to identify clear enforcement priorities and greatly limits 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.12 Although DHS’s new policy discusses 
the removal of criminals, it provides no clear hierarchy as to whom should be 
deported. Furthermore, the policy does not define the range of criminal offenses 
included and even extends to individuals who have been charged with, but not 
yet convicted of, a crime. The Trump Administration’s policy also stresses that no 
group will be exempted from enforcement through prosecutorial discretion. This 
shift has caused immigrant communities to live in terror. 
Restoring clear removal priorities and encouraging U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) attorneys to exercise prosecutorial discretion in the 
interests of justice would help reduce fear among immigrant communities and 
focus limited resources on deporting truly dangerous individuals. 
B.  THE EXPANSION OF EXPEDITED REMOVAL 
The expansion of immigration enforcement over the past decade has relied 
heavily on the increased use of expedited removal as well as a similar but distinct 
process called reinstatement of removal.13 Expedited removal proceedings allow 
DHS to remove individuals quickly without a court hearing. Reinstatement of 
removal allows DHS to reinstate a prior removal order if someone reenters the 
United States unlawfully. Under these procedures, noncitizens have the 
 
[https://perma.cc/9EL6-USA8]. 
 9. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All Field 
Office Dirs. et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration 
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 
17, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C7GT-RVCA]. 
 10. MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., UNDERSTANDING THE POTENTIAL 
IMPACT OF EXECUTIVE ACTION ON IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 1 (July 2015), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/understanding-potential-impact-executive-action-
immigration-enforcement (click “Download Report” button). 
 11. Id. at 4. 
 12. Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan 
et al., Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to Serve the National Interest (Feb. 20, 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-
Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6GN-D93G] (stating that 
“prosecutorial discretion shall not be exercised in a manner that exempts or excludes a specified class 
or category of [noncitizens] from enforcement of the immigration laws” and that DHS “shall faithfully 
execute the immigration laws of the United States against all removable [individuals]” (emphasis 
added)); see also Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 13. See Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 
184 (2017). 
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opportunity to go before an immigration judge only if they (1) express a fear of 
persecution or torture, and (2) pass either a credible fear interview (expedited 
removal) or a reasonable fear interview (reinstatement of removal) conducted by 
an asylum officer. 
Congress created expedited removal in 1996, giving DHS the discretion to 
apply it to individuals who (1) enter illegally or seek to gain entry through fraud 
or misrepresentation, and (2) have been continuously physically present in the 
United States for less than two years.14 A DHS policy issued in 2004, however, 
limited the use of expedited removal to individuals apprehended within one 
hundred miles of the border who have not been continuously physically present 
for more than fourteen days.15 
Under the Obama Administration, the number of expedited removals nearly 
doubled from 109,742 in FY 2010 to 192,417 in FY 2013.16 Similarly, the number 
of reinstated removals increased from 124,624 in FY 2010 to 162,579 in FY 
2013.17 In FY 2013, expedited removals accounted for 44% of all removals, and 
reinstated removals accounted for another 38% of all removals. Thus, the vast 
majority of removals occurred through one of these processes that circumvent 
immigration courts. That did not change much during the initial years of the 
Trump Administration. In FY 2017, expedited removal accounted for 37% of all 
removals, and reinstatement accounted for 41% of all removals.18 
However, expedited removal may soon become an even greater percentage of 
removals and increase the total number of removals from the United States. Soon 
after taking office, President Trump announced his plan to expand expedited 
removal.19 In July 2019, DHS implemented that plan, issuing a notice in the 
Federal Register announcing an expansion of expedited removal applicable to 
individuals who entered illegally, through fraud or misrepresentation, and are 
apprehended anywhere in the United States within two years of entry.20 Under this 
new policy, even individuals who have established families, homes, and businesses 
in the United States will be vulnerable to swift deportation without a chance to 
go before an immigration judge. This dramatic expansion of expedited removal is 
expected to affect an estimated 328,000 noncitizens.21 
There are many concerns related to the use and expansion of expedited 
removal. First, the process moves so quickly that most people have no opportunity 
to consult with an attorney or gather evidence. Second, there are practical 
problems with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers failing to ask the 
 
 14. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii) (2018). 
 15. Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877-01, 48,800 (Aug. 11, 2004). 
 16. See Ramón & Reyes, supra note 7. 
 17. DHS ANNUAL REPORT 2017, supra note 5, at 12 tbl.6. 
 18. Id. In 2017, DHS removed a total of 295,364 people; of these, 103,704 were expedited 
removals, 120,545 were reinstated removal orders, and 71,115 were all other removals. Id. 
 19. See Exec. Order No. 13,767, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, 
82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 20. Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 84 Fed. Reg. 35,409-01, 35,414 (July 23, 2019). 
 21. NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, EXPANDED EXPEDITED REMOVAL 2 (2019), 
https://immigrationforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Summary-of-Expedited-Removal-
Expansion-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3NX-NSSE]. 
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proper questions to determine if a noncitizen has a fear of persecution or torture, 
or even pressuring noncitizens to withdraw applications for admission.22 Third, 
there is very limited review of an asylum officer’s credible fear determination. A 
noncitizen can request review of an asylum officer’s decision by an immigration 
judge, but the Immigration and Nationality Act significantly limits judicial review 
by a federal court.23 
Limiting expedited removal, including revoking its most recent expansion, is 
necessary to protect basic procedural rights in the removal process and uphold 
fundamental due process. No one, but especially not individuals with substantial 
ties to the United States, should be subjected to deportation without adequate 
procedural protections. Expanding judicial review of expedited removal orders 
would also help ensure a fair and meaningful process. 
C.  GREATER INVOLVEMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES 
The last decade is also characterized by a marked increase in the participation 
of state and local law enforcement agencies in immigration enforcement. The 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) 
laid the foundation for this cooperation by including a provision, Section 287(g), 
that allows the federal government to enter into written agreements with states 
and local governments to enforce some aspects of immigration law.24 However, 
the program did not gain traction until after the 9/11 attacks, when the 
Department of Justice issued an opinion supporting the authority of state police 
to enforce immigration law.25 
The first 287(g) agreement was signed in 2002, and the program continued to 
grow rapidly under the George W. Bush Administration.26 At least two models of 
287(g) programs emerged. Under the “task force model,” deputized officers could 
inquire about immigration status after an arrest, while under the “jailhouse 
model,” deputized officers identified noncitizens in local jails and transferred 
 
 22. See ELIZABETH CASSIDY & TIFFANY LYNCH, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 
BARRIERS TO PROTECTION: THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 19–23 
(2016), http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Barriers%20To%20Protection.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A7TC-LQ5T]; MARK HETFIELD ET AL., U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL, VOLUME I: FINDINGS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS 4–6 (2005), 
https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/Volume_I.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KXP6-YVWX]. 
 23. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2018). 
 24. Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 287(g), 
110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-563 to -564 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)). 
 25. Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703, 1722 
(2018) (citing Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Non-Preemption of the 
Authority of State and Local Law Enforcement Officials to Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations 
(Apr. 3, 2002), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y2EG-YCFX]). 
 26. Michael Coon, Local Immigration Enforcement and Arrests of the Hispanic Population, 5 J. 
MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 645, 648 (2017). 
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them to immigration detention centers.27 A hybrid model was also established 
that combined the task force and jailhouse models.28 
The 287(g) program continued to expand under the first few years of the 
Obama Administration, involving around seventy state and local agencies at its 
peak. However, the Obama Administration then reversed course. In 2012, 
Obama ended both the task force model and the hybrid model due to concerns 
about racial profiling.29 Funding for the 287(g) program was cut by two-thirds and 
the number of participating law enforcement agencies fell by over half.30 That 
same year, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Arizona v. United States, which 
held that several sections of an Arizona state law were preempted by federal 
immigration law31 but left intact a provision that permitted local law enforcement 
to investigate a person’s immigration status.32 
Under President Trump, 287(g) programs have more than doubled in number, 
reaching a historic high of seventy-nine participating agencies in 2018, one-third 
of them in Texas.33 There are currently seventy-five law enforcement agencies 
participating in 287(g) programs.34 During the first sixteen months of the Trump 
Administration, over 12,000 noncitizens were deported under the 287(g) 
program—over 2.5 times the number deported pursuant to that program during 
the last sixteen months of the Obama Administration.35 The 287(g) agreements 
formed under Trump also embrace the task force model that Obama had phased 
out in 2012, rather than the traditional jailhouse model.36 
In January 2017, Trump also resurrected the Secure Communities program,37 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 647. 
 30. The Data Team, Under Donald Trump, More Cops Are Acting as Immigration-Enforcement Agents, 
ECONOMIST (July 27, 2018), https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/07/27/under-
donald-trump-more-cops-are-acting-as-immigration-enforcement-agents [https://perma.cc/A734-
MJ7F]. 
 31. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 403, 407, 410 (2012). 
 32. Id. at 415. 
 33. The Data Team, supra note 30; see also DAVID SCOTT FITZGERALD ET AL., CTR. FOR 
COMPARATIVE IMMIGRATION STUDIES, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS FACE THREATS TO CIVIL RIGHTS 
AND INCREASED SOCIAL HOSTILITY 36 (Feb. 28, 2019), 
https://ccis.ucsd.edu/_files/conference_papers_present/CNDH-final-3.4.19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6VTV-V2KF]. 
 34. Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. 
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/287g [https://perma.cc/6TAC-U48W] 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2019). 
 35. Claudia Flores, A Controversial ICE Program and the Decision Facing Localities This June, CTR. 
FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 16, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2019/05/16/469871/controversial-
ice-program-decision-facing-localities-june/ [https://perma.cc/EZH2-PYH5]; Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement Arrests: ICE Data Through May 2018, TRAC IMMIGRATION, SYRACUSE UNIV., 
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/arrest/ (click “By Fiscal Year” under “Graph Time 
Scale”; then select “All” under “State”; then select “All” under “County/Surrounding Area”; then 
select “287(g) Program” under “Apprehension Method/Agency”) (last visited Oct. 10, 2019). 
 36. Huyen Pham, 287(g) Agreements in the Trump Era, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1253, 1255 
(2018). 
 37. Exec. Order No. 13,767, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, 82 
Fed. Reg. 8793, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
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which was established in 2008 by the Bush Administration and then terminated 
in 2014 under the Obama Administration because of concerns that the program 
targeted low-level offenders who only committed traffic violations.38 Under 
Secure Communities, state and local police share the fingerprints of arrested 
individuals with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and ICE. If it turns out 
that someone is deportable, ICE issues a detainer, which is a request for the local 
jail to hold the individual for forty-eight hours until ICE takes custody. The Secure 
Communities program led to the deportation of approximately 320,000 people 
under the Bush and early Obama Administrations.39 Under the Trump 
Administration, the program led to the deportation of approximately 6,200 
people per month during the first nine months.40 
Ending 287(g) cooperation agreements and terminating Secure Communities 
would protect against racial profiling and help restore immigrant communities’ 
trust in law enforcement. It would also help ensure that Fourth Amendment 
rights are not violated by detention without probable cause. 
D.  THE SURGE OF “SANCTUARY” AND “ANTI-SANCTUARY” LAWS AND POLICIES 
At the same time, Trump has launched an unprecedented attack on so-called 
“sanctuary” cities.41 While sanctuary policies have existed for decades, they 
proliferated after 2011 in response to the rise in deportations of noncitizens with 
minor or no criminal records.42 Shortly after his election in 2017, Trump signed 
an executive order announcing that he would cut federal funding to sanctuary 
cities.43 However, his efforts to defund states like California and cities like New 
York and Chicago were unsuccessful, as courts blocked them on federalism and 
anti-commandeering grounds.44 Currently, seven states and nearly two hundred 
counties and cities have adopted sanctuary laws or policies that limit cooperation 
with ICE and restrict ICE’s access to local resources.45 
But there is also a trend in the opposite direction, with states passing “anti-
sanctuary” laws to prohibit cities and counties from adopting sanctuary policies. 
At least seven states have passed such laws, including Texas, Alabama, Indiana, 
 
 38. FITZGERALD ET AL., supra note 33, at 38. 
 39. Id.; see also Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, 
https://www.ice.gov/secure-communities [https://perma.cc/W8QK-P9RQ] (last updated Mar. 20, 
2018). 
 40. Deportations Under ICE’s Secure Communities Program, TRAC IMMIGRATION, SYRACUSE 
UNIV. (Apr. 25, 2018), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/509/ [https://perma.cc/H3HP-
T969]. 
 41. See generally Rose Cuison Villazor, What is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133 (2008). 
 42. FITZGERALD ET AL., supra note 33, at 40. 
 43. Exec. Order No. 13,767, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, 82 
Fed. Reg. 8793, 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 44. Pratheepan Gulasekaram et al., Anti-Sanctuary and Immigration Localism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 
837, 853 (2019); see also, e.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1231 (9th 
Cir. 2018). 
 45. Marc Rod, ‘Sanctuary’ Policies Can Limit but Won’t Stop Trump Deportation Plans, CNBC (June 
21, 2019, 12:50 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/21/sanctuary-policies-wont-stop-trumps-
deportation-plans.html [https://perma.cc/4X45-J7V9]. 
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Iowa, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Tennessee.46 These state anti-sanctuary 
laws have fared better in courts. For example, the Fifth Circuit upheld Texas’s 
law, called SB4.47 
In May 2019, Trump announced a new program—the Warrant Service Officer 
Program—to bolster his attack against sanctuary cities. This program provides a 
more limited form of cooperation than the 287(g) program but makes it easier to 
participate, requiring officers to receive only a single day of training and relieving 
them of the responsibility to interview detainees to determine their immigration 
status.48 It allows local law enforcement agencies to arrest and temporarily detain 
noncitizens on behalf of ICE even if local policies prohibit doing so, giving ICE 
forty-eight hours to take the noncitizens into federal custody.49 
In addition to challenging anti-sanctuary laws and attacks on sanctuary laws 
and policies in court, immigrant rights advocates and organizers should continue 
building coalitions and applying public pressure on states and localities to protect 
immigrant communities. 
III.  THE EXPANSION AND PRIVATIZATION OF IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION 
Besides increased enforcement, one of the biggest challenges for noncitizens 
during the past decade was the expansion of immigration detention. IIRIRA and 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act both passed in 1996, greatly 
expanding the categories of offenses that result in mandatory detention.50 When 
immigration detention is statutorily mandated, individuals are not eligible for 
release on bond. In nonmandatory cases, ICE has discretion to release someone 
on bond or to utilize an alternative to detention, such as electronic monitoring.51 
Although alternatives to detention are much less expensive than detention and 
have proven highly effective, ICE prefers keeping noncitizens detained because 
their cases move faster and it is easier to execute a deportation at the end of the 
process.52 
In FY 1994, before IIRIRA, the average daily detained population was only 
 
 46. Gulasekaram et al., supra note 44, at 839–40. 
 47. City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164, 173 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 48. Abigail Hauslohner, ICE Provides Local Police a Way to Work Around ‘Sanctuary’ Policies, Act as 




 49. Id. 
 50. Dora Schriro, Weeping in the Playtime of Others: The Obama Administration’s Failed Reform of 
ICE Family Detention Practices, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 452, 454 (2017). 
 51. See generally Fatma E. Marouf, Alternatives to Immigration Detention, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2141 (2017). 
 52. John Burnett, ‘Alternatives to Detention’ Are Cheaper than Jail, but Cases Take Far Longer, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (July 18, 2018, 4:24 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/18/629496174/alternatives-
to-detention-are-cheaper-than-jails-but-cases-take-far-longer [https://perma.cc/GP84-V2D3]. 
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6,785.53 By FY 2000, it had increased to 19,458.54 The Obama Administration 
significantly expanded the use of immigration detention. By FY 2010, the daily 
detained population was 30,885.55 This expansion continued even more rapidly 
under the Trump Administration. In 2019, the average daily detained population 
exceeded 50,000.56 Annually, the number of immigration detainees has doubled 
from around 200,000 in 2002 to over 400,000 in the past decade.57 To support 
this expansion of detention, ICE’s budget for custody operations increased from 
around $864 million in FY 2005 to $1.8 billion in FY 2010 to $3.1 billion in FY 
2018.58 
One of the factors underlying the expansion of detention under the Obama 
and Trump Administrations is the so-called “bed mandate.”59 Since 2009, 
congressional appropriations for DHS have specified the number of immigration-
detention beds that DHS should maintain, establishing an informal quota for 
detention.60 In 2018, Congress specified a mandate of 40,500 beds.61 In 2019, 
the Trump Administration requested funding for 52,000 beds, but a 
congressional deal between Democrats and Republicans maintained funding at 
the 2018 level.62 Nevertheless, ICE managed to use its resources to detain over 
50,000 noncitizens per day in 2019.63 
ICE is only able to detain this many people by relying on private companies 
that not only lobby for the bed mandate but also make detention on this scale 
practically feasible.64 Over 70% of immigration detainees are now held in privately 
operated facilities.65 In some cases, ICE contracts directly with private companies 
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to operate detention facilities.66 In other cases, ICE contracts with state or local 
governments—or, less commonly, with the U.S. Marshals Services—which then 
subcontract with private companies.67 The privatization of detention poses many 
challenges. Since constitutional and administrative protections may not apply to 
private companies, privatization makes it harder to bring legal challenges to 
detention conditions. Additionally, ICE has not held its contractors (and 
subcontractors) accountable for failing to enforce ICE’s own detention standards 
and often does not even include a quality-assurance surveillance plan in its 
contracts.68 In recent years, inadequate detention conditions for families and 
children in particular have attracted widespread criticism. 
Ending the use of privatized detention may seem farfetched, but the Executive 
Branch committed to do so once before under President Obama. In 2016, the 
Obama Administration announced that it would phase out the use of private for-
profit prisons for federal inmates.69 A future Administration could similarly 
decide to phase out the use of privatized immigration detention facilities. States 
can also decide to end privatized detention. For example, California recently 
decided to phase out private immigration detention centers.70 
Additionally, the United States should stop detaining children and families. 
Relying more on alternatives to detention, including community case 
management programs, would reduce costs for the government while protecting 
immigrants’ rights and promoting compliance with court procedures. Detention 
should be used only as a last resort, consistent with human rights norms. Going 
even further, it is worth examining what would happen if we shifted the enormous 
resources currently being poured into immigration enforcement and detention 
into providing health insurance, work authorization, in-state tuition, and federal 
student loans to all immigrants in order to maximize our collective social and 
economic well-being. 
IV.  DISMANTLING THE U.S. ASYLUM AND REFUGEE SYSTEMS 
A third major shift over the last decade, specifically under the Trump 
Administration, involves radical changes to the asylum process and dramatic cuts 
in refugee admissions that threaten to undermine the entire system of surrogate 
protection. These changes take many forms, affecting credible fear interviews 
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conducted by asylum officers, removal proceedings in immigration court, and 
policies aimed at deterring migrants from seeking asylum in the United States. 
The frequency, speed, and combination of these changes exacerbate their impact. 
To begin with, the Trump Administration has cracked down on credible fear 
interviews by issuing revised training materials for the asylum officers who 
conduct them.71 These training materials impose a heightened, harsher standard 
to establish a credible fear of persecution, resulting in a decrease in credible fear 
findings. Additionally, DHS is beginning to use frontline CBP officers to conduct 
credible fear interviews, instead of relying exclusively on asylum officers who are 
trained in the intricacies of asylum law.72 
The asylum system was further eroded by former Attorney General Sessions, 
who interfered in immigration adjudication in an unprecedented way, deciding 
as many immigration cases in one year as the attorneys general under Bush and 
Obama did during eight-year periods.73 The decisions issued by Sessions, which 
represent the highest level of agency adjudication, seek to speed up removal 
proceedings and deportations by making it harder to have a case administratively 
closed, receive a continuance, or pursue certain types of asylum claims involving 
persecution by non-state actors, such as cases involving domestic violence or gang-
related harm.74 In fact, Sessions overruled the Board of Immigration Appeals’s 
only precedent granting asylum in a case involving domestic violence.75 A more 
recent decision by Attorney General Barr similarly makes it harder to establish 
eligibility for asylum in cases based on family relationships.76 
For the first time in history, former Attorney General Sessions also imposed 
quotas on the number of cases that immigration judges are expected to decide 
each year, tying their performance evaluations to those quotas as a way of 
pressuring them into making faster decisions.77 The National Association of 
Immigration Judges opposed these changes, arguing that they were being treated 
as enforcement officers rather than neutral decision-makers.78 
On top of these changes, the Trump Administration adopted various policies 
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aimed at deterring migrants from seeking asylum in the United States. These 
included separating families; criminally prosecuting migrants, including asylum 
seekers, under a “zero tolerance” policy; creating harsh detention conditions; and 
prolonging the detention of children. Other policies aimed at deterrence involve 
keeping asylum seekers outside the country. For example, the policy of “metering” 
asylum seekers at ports of entry, which was implemented on a small scale in certain 
locations under Obama, has spread across the entire southwest border under 
Trump.79 Metering involves making asylum seekers wait in Mexico for weeks or 
months until there is enough “room” at the port of entry to apply for asylum. 
The Trump Administration also initiated the so-called Migrant Protection 
Protocols, which involve returning non-Mexican asylum seekers to Mexico to wait 
there for their immigration court proceedings after they have passed a credible 
fear interview.80 
Furthermore, in July 2019, the Trump Administration issued a “transit rule” 
that bars noncitizens from applying for asylum in the United States if they have 
crossed through a third country without applying for asylum there.81 The rule 
does not require the transit country to be safe and has only very limited 
exceptions. In September 2019, the Supreme Court allowed the transit rule to go 
into effect while litigation against it continued in the lower courts.82 This transit 
rule builds on an earlier rule, published in 2018, that renders people ineligible 
for asylum if they entered the United States outside a port of entry.83 That rule 
never took effect because it was stayed and then vacated by federal courts.84 
President Trump is also seeking to enter into “safe third country” agreements 
with a number of countries, most notably Mexico and Guatemala.85 These 
agreements would require asylum seekers who travel through a country that is a 
party to the agreement to apply for asylum there before applying in the United 
States. In July 2019, Trump announced that he had entered into a safe third 
country agreement with Guatemala,86 but it appears the agreement was not 
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actually a safe third country agreement.87 In September 2019, there was a similar 
announcement about an agreement with El Salvador that turned out not to be a 
safe third country agreement.88 Both the transit rule and any safe third country 
agreements would create additional barriers to asylum. 
Just as the Trump Administration has adopted regulations and policies to block 
access to asylum, it has also made severe cutbacks to refugee admissions. The U.S. 
Refugee Admissions Program has existed for nearly forty years. Under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, the President determines the number of 
refugees to be admitted each year, with the advice and consent of Congress.89 
When Obama left office, the ceiling on refugee admissions was 110,000.90 Since 
taking office, Trump has slashed the cap on refugee admissions each year, from 
50,000 in 2017 to 45,000 in 2018 to 30,000 in 2019, an all-time low.91 Yet even 
this limited number of refugees was not admitted. In FY 2018, only 22,491 
refugees were actually admitted to the United States.92 The Trump 
Administration is considering further cutbacks for 2020, with some officials even 
proposing that zero refugees be admitted.93 Meanwhile, the number of refugees 
worldwide is at a historic high of nearly twenty-six million.94 
The other branches of government should intervene to protect the rights of 
asylum seekers and refugees. Congress can help turn around the drastic reduction 
in refugee admissions by advising the President against it and refusing to consent 
to cutbacks. What would happen if the number of refugees we admitted actually 
reflected the wealth of the United States compared to other countries? Or if we 
compensated developing countries where a disproportionate number of the 
world’s refugees currently live? 
As for the numerous changes to the asylum system discussed above, which are 
being actively litigated, the courts hold the special responsibility of protecting 
statutory and constitutional rights and should reject arbitrary or unreasonable 
rules and policy changes that threaten to undermine the entire system of 
protection. The Seventh Circuit recently did this in the most vehement way, 
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rebuking the Board of Immigration Appeals for its blatant “defiance of a remand 
order”95 in following the words of the Attorney General instead of the court’s 
opinion and denying a second remand due to the Board’s “obduracy,” “disdain[],” 
and “effrontery.”96 The court reminded the Board in no uncertain terms that “the 
‘Judicial Power’ under Article III of the Constitution is one to make conclusive 
decisions, not subject to disapproval or revision by another branch of 
government.”97 
V.  THE RESURGENCE OF RACISM, XENOPHOBIA, AND WHITE 
NATIONALISM 
Racism and xenophobia have existed in the United States and affected the 
country’s immigration policies for centuries.98 In recent decades, biases against 
Muslims, Mexicans, and Central Americans have had a particularly strong impact 
on immigrant communities. In 2012, for example, the Department of Justice 
found that the Sheriff of Alamance County, North Carolina, engaged in a pattern 
or practice of discriminatory policing of Latinos in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.99 In 2013, a federal court found that Joe Arpaio, the Sheriff of 
Maricopa County, Arizona, relied on racial profiling and illegal detention to target 
Latinos.100 
Under the Trump Administration, explicit discrimination and xenophobic 
fearmongering have been a central part of the President’s rhetoric, fueling a rise 
in white nationalism.101 Trump has described immigrants from Mexico and 
Central America as criminals, drug dealers, rapists, murderers, gang members, 
fraudsters, and animals who “prey on our citizens”102 and “infest” our country.103 
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He stated that he prefers immigrants from Norway instead of those from “shithole 
countries” like Haiti, El Salvador, and African nations.104 Furthermore, when 
asked about immigration to Europe, he described cultural change as “a very 
negative thing”105 and tweeted, “We don’t want what is happening with 
immigration in Europe to happen with us!”106 
After running on a campaign promising a “total and complete shutdown of 
Muslims entering the United States” and calling Islam the “enemy,”107 Trump 
issued an executive order within days of his election that banned citizens of several 
Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States.108 As court challenges 
ensued, he modified the ban twice. The third version was ultimately upheld by 
the Supreme Court despite compelling evidence that animus against Muslims 
motivated the ban. The Court found that as long as the government could offer 
a reason for the ban that was not unconstitutional, i.e., that it was not motivated 
solely by animus, the Establishment Clause was not violated.109 Because the 
government asserted national security justifications that were “plausibly related” 
to the ban, the Court upheld it.110 
Biases against Mexicans, Central Americans, and minorities from developing 
countries more generally have likewise fueled some of the most significant changes 
in immigration policies under Trump. These include not only the changes to the 
asylum system described above but also the decisions to rescind Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)111 and to terminate Temporary Protected Status 
(TPS) for El Salvador, Nicaragua, Haiti, Sudan, and other countries.112 Lawsuits 
challenging the rescission of DACA and termination of TPS have raised Equal 
Protection Clause claims based on evidence of racial animus, as well as arguments 
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under the Due Process Clause and Administrative Procedure Act (APA).113 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the rescission of DACA114 and 
heard arguments in the case on November 12, 2019.115 Similarly, the Trump 
Administration’s decision to expand the definition of a “public charge,” which 
would prevent thousands of noncitizens from being admitted to the United States 
and becoming permanent residents, has been challenged as intentionally 
discriminating against Latinos and immigrants of color.116 
Courts will need to consider the animus allegations and equal protection 
challenges raised in these cases carefully. At the same time, the public must 
continue repudiating rhetoric rooted in xenophobia and racism. There is a risk of 
normalizing these expressions of animus and growing numb. But resisting that 
tendency is essential to creating and maintaining an inclusive and diverse culture. 
Transforming the lives of immigrants in the United States requires reimagining 
what is possible. Immigrant rights organizers and advocates tend to be far ahead 
of lawyers and law professors in this regard. Instead of just demanding better 
training for ICE and CBP officers to address racial and xenophobic violence, 
perhaps we need to restructure these agencies from the ground up, make special 
visas available for members of historically subordinated groups, or apply strict 
scrutiny to immigration classifications based on race, nationality, and religion. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
We are facing a multipronged attack against immigrants that involves 
manufacturing a crisis to support a mindset of detention and enforcement; 
criminalizing immigrants; invoking fears of a racial, cultural, and security threat; 
stoking economic anxiety; equating the “rule of law” with deportation; and 
denigrating courts. We must therefore respond with a multipronged strategy that 
is not limited to tinkering with the edges of the law. We must offer a positive 
vision for immigrants in American society, one that builds power and attacks a 
structure of inequality sustained by racism that benefits from the labor of 
immigrants while denying them basic rights. 
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